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ABSTRACT

Author: Iyer, Swarnalakshmi M. M.S.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: A Case Study on Monetary Fraud in a Cashless Economy
Major Professor: Eric Dietz
The payment market has many electronic instruments like cards and mobile phones
competing with cash for market share. This thesis compares costs, involving two
components: (i) the cost of implementing and maintaining an economy where the
instrument can be used and, (ii) the losses suffered due to abuse of the payment
instrument, for cash and card instruments. A case study on three countries Sweden, United
States and India is conducted to survey variations in costs for cash and card instruments in
economies that have varying extents of cash in circulation. Findings show that losses
suffered due to abuse of cash as a payment instrument are much higher than that of card
instruments. The cost of implementing and maintaining a system for electronic payment
instruments are less than half of the cost of currency operations. A society with less cash
could hence potentially be more resistant to abuse of payment instrument and more cost
effcient as compared to a cash based one. However, electronic payment methods do not
provide the fnancial privacy and fnancial independence that cash provides. Thus
individual rights and liberty are better safeguarded in a cash based economy.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The economy of a society relies on the trade in that society. During the days of the
barter system in 9000 BC, trade involved the exchange of goods, usually cattle and food
grains. The barter system was succeeded by exchanging coins made from bronze and
copper, later followed by coins made of gold and silver. Cash, in the form of coins and
paper based currency, issued by authorities was introduced in the middle ages. This shift
from precious metal coins to paper currency marks a shift from commodity money to fat
money. While coins made from precious metals could be used for purposes other than
trade, cash could solely be used as a medium for exchange in trade. This makes cash fat
money. Fast forward to present day, we have multiple fnancial instruments that can be
used for payment in return for goods and services. With services like credit cards, debit
cards, electronic wallet, bitcoins, mobile payments and direct transfers, the payment
instrument sector has been fooded with payment instruments that compete with cash. In
some developed markets like Denmark, Norway and Sweden, these non-cash methods
have surpassed cash to become the most prevalent method of payment (Segendorf &
Wretman, 2015). In other emerging markets, Kenya and India, a growing acceptance for
non-cash payment instruments is being observed (Thomas et al., 2013).
Besides, consumer acceptance, non-cash payment methods also enjoy
encouragement from governments that seek to promote electronic means of payment. A
2014 report by the World Bank, identifes digitization of payments as being capable of
spurring economic growth, achieving greater fnancial inclusion and increasing the
participation of women in the economy. It calls on the Group 20 (G20) nations to embrace
a digital fnancial system (Klapper & Singer, 2014). The Australian Government, in
2015, passed a bill to provide welfare benefts to citizens using a Cashless Welfare Card.
Spending restrictions placed on the funds in the card would not allow benefciaries to
spend on alcohol and gaming. In 2015, the Kenyan government approached MasterCard,
to roll out smart cards that could disburse welfare funds to its citizens. The push for
non-cash methods has also seen a parallel push to reduce paper money. In 2013, the
Mexican government put a cap of 500,000 pesos on real estate cash payments and of
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200,000 pesos on jewelry, automobile or lottery. In 2014, the Belgium government
prohibited the purchase of any real estate using cash.
To encourage the shift from paper to electronic mode, Norway introduced
differential pricing for payment transactions based on the mode of payment. Banks in
Norway have a lower fee for electronic payments due to the lower cost of processing
electronic payment as opposed to cash payment. This price incentive has resulted in the
rise of electronic payments in Norway from 10% in 1987 to 60% in 1996
(D. B. Humphrey, Kim, & Vale, 2001). Other countries have introduced a cap on the
maximum amount for transactions that can be made using cash. For example, Portugal
outlawed cash payments between consumers and traders for goods and services exceeding
e1000. The Portugal administration requires payments in excess of e1000, to be made to
traders bank account in a manner that allows for the identifcation of the receiver using a
bank account number or another such identifer. Other European nations like Denmark,
Greece and Spain have similar caps on cash payments (Beretta, 2014). Some of these
measures lean more towards restricting cash use than promoting electronic payments;
however, they achieve the same result of shifting consumers from paper to electronic
means of payment.
The motivation behind containing the use of cash is to curb activities of organised
crime groups (OCG), currency counterfeiting, money laundering and terrorist fnancing
(ML/TF). However, the growing use of non-cash payment methods has also seen a rise in
a new criminal activities that specifcally target the digital fnancial world. Crimes like
fraud using stolen card credentials, online banking fraud, skimming and counterfeiting of
cards are amongst those birthed by a shift to digital fnance.
Certain losses are specifcally enabled due the nature of payment instrument
involved. For instance, the introduction of counterfeit currency can disturb the balance in
an economy that supports cash as a payment instrument. Similarly, stolen credit card
details used by bad actors for making purchases, end up causing a loss to the bank, the
card issuer and sometimes the card holder, depending on the legislations in the region.
This study evaluates losses due to illegal activities that exploit the nature of the payment
instrument used in the economy. The aim is to contribute to the narrative of weighing the
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pros and cons of shifting away from a cash based economy to an electronic payment based
economy.

1.1 Problem Statement
Reports are rampant of credit card fraud and breaches in major companies leading
to the theft of customers’ fnancial information. These fnancial details, once stolen, are
illegally sold in the online market space. A report by ‘USA Today’ states that credit card
details are being sold for as low as a couple of dollars per card (How stolen credit cards
are fenced on the Dark Web, n.d.). Apart from card details being leaked due to a breach of
the merchant company database, cards are also being skimmed using cheaply available
devices for fnancial information and/or card counterfeiting. Other electronic methods of
payment like online banking and the relatively new mobile payment systems have also
been abused by bad actors. Despite the security issues in digital fnance, especially in
retail payment sector which includes mostly person to business, person to person, and,
person to government payments, there is a collective push to promote the acceptance of
electronic payment methods over traditional paper based payments by authorities around
the world.
Given the rising fraud in electronic payments and the vulnerability of electronic
payment instruments, this unsubtle push for electronic means of payment raises concerns
of whether a shift to electronic means would expose the society to a greater risk of losing
millions to fraud. This thesis examines the cost effectiveness of shifting from paper
money to electronic money. Cost of a payment instrument is taken to be the infrastructural
requirements to support the payment instrument as well as the cost of losses that are
suffered specifcally due to the abuse of the nature of payment instrument involved.

1.2 Research Question
This study aims to answer the following questions:
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1. What is the cost of losses suffered from illegal acts facilitated by cash in the
economy?
2. What is the cost of losses suffered from illegal acts facilitated by non-cash payment
methods, more specifcally illegal activities facilitated by using electronic cards as
payment instruments, in the economy?
3. Does the shift from paper to electronic means of payment reduce the total societal
cost (i.e. cost of implementing, cost of maintaining, and the cost of loss due to
fraud)?

1.3 Signifcance of the Problem
The transition from a cash economy to a cashless one is an issue which raises a
number of signifcant questions and the study of which can help lead to more informed
policy decisions. A number of organizations have studied effects of shifting to digital
payment systems. The World Bank, along with the ‘Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’
and the ‘Better than Cash Alliance’, published a report in 2014 advocating the digitization
of payments for a ”broad-based economic growth, fnancial inclusion, and womens
economic empowerment” (Klapper & Singer, 2014). Various countries have undertaken
studies, sometimes as a result of their government’s initiative, to compare the costs of
using paper money and electronic money (De Grauwe, Buyst, & Rinaldi, 2000;
D. B. Humphrey, Pulley, & Vesala, 2000; Segendorf & Jansson, 2012; Swartz et al.,
2004). These studies factor the costs of implementing and maintaining a cash based
economy versus an electronic based economy. The push from certain governments for
digitizing payments has set in motion a parallel push to phase out cash. Harry Leinonen, a
Senior Financial Counsellor in the Finnish Ministry of Finance, claimed that abolishing
cash could result in a 1-2% of GDP worth of savings, given the high direct costs of
payment and processing as well as indirect costs (tax evasion, losses, safekeeping costs,
robberies, and black economy costs) involved with using cash (Beer, Gnan, & Birchler,
2016).
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The role of cash in activities like money laundering and counterfeiting have been
studied. Most of these studies show that cash plays a dominant part in facilitating the
aforementioned crimes (Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to
counterfeiting of currency, 2013; Money laundering through the physical transportation
of cash, 2015; The Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s 2014 status report, 2014; Why
is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by criminal groups as a facilitator
for money laundering., 2015); an argument used by authorities to promote the phasing out
of cash. Parallel to this, cost of fraud in electronic payment have been reported to
constantly rise over the years (2016 LexisNexis True Cost of FraudSM Study, 2016;
Anderson et al., 2013).
While various studies exist to compare costs of implementing and maintaining a
cash based economy against cost of an electronic based economy, a comparison between
the value lost to illegal activities, specifcally facilitated due to the nature of the payment
instrument used, in either of these systems is scarce. With various countries considering to
inch away from a paper based economy, a comparison of the value lost to illegal activities
due to the nature of different payment instruments, becomes relevant to any policy
decisions that may be made in this regard. This thesis investigates the value lost to fraud
in cash and non-cash mediums. It builds on previous studies that researched the costs
involved in establishing and running a paper based or electronic economy, like the printing
costs of currency versus the cost of setting up the IT infrastructure for electronic
transactions. The results from earlier studies on cost of payment instruments are borrowed
to draw conclusions regarding what payment instrument emerges as more cost effective to
the society.

1.4 Scope
This thesis focuses on the losses that incurred as a result of illegal activities
specifcally fueled by the payment medium. Illegal acts like money laundering and
currency counterfeiting are specifcally aided by cash. Illegal activities like credit card
skimming and electronic payment frauds occur in non-cash digital payment mediums.
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This study does not look at losses due any illegal acts that are not a result of the payment
instrument used; like arson or denial of service attacks. Losses are Data on cost of illegal
activities exploiting nature of the multiple digital payment instruments other than payment
cards is limited. Hence, only the cost of losses due to card fraud have been considered.
Card fraud includes activities that use stolen or lost cards/card credentials. To evaluate the
costs, a case study approach has been adopted with only three countries being studied Sweden, USA and India. The study also limits itself to only weighing the cost of
sustaining a cash or non-cash economy. While it is imperative to consider the effect on
privacy of consumers, the issues of fnancial security granted by the physical possession of
liquid assets, and its effect on monetary policies before transitioning to an entirely
cashless economy, this study briefy discusses it but does not fully address these concerns.

1.5 Assumptions
Data for nations being studied shows that payment cards are the dominant
electronic payment method used by consumers. The losses due to fraudulent activities in
non-cash payment medium have been taken from sources that primarily account for card
fraud. This study assumes card fraud losses to be representative of the general trends in
digital payment frauds. Losses from cash aided crimes cannot be accurately determined.
Data on cash crime losses sourced from various studies are estimates based on the crimes
that have been noticed by legal agencies in different countries. These estimates are
assumed to be close to the actual fgure and are used for analysis in this work.

1.6 Limitations
There is no reliable way of gathering accurate data on exactly how many cash
transactions were made during a period, or what is the size of the shadow economy
fostered by illegal activities in society. The exact losses to the economy due to organised
crime, tax evasion and other illegal activities cannot be accurately determined. This study
is hence limited by the accuracy of estimated fgures obtained from cited sources. Card
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fraud is one component of the total losses due to illegal activities in the digital payment
space, and is the only one examined in this study. Mobile payment fraud, ransomware
losses, illegal transactions using bitcoin, and other such avenues of losses in the digital
payment space have not been addressed. This thesis only focuses on one aspect of
migration to electronic payment systems, namely costs of use and abuse of payment
instruments. The complete discussion on migration to cashless systems involves
addressing privacy issues, public liberty concerns and effect on monetary regulations,
among others. These concerns have not been addressed in this work. Data used in this
work do not all belong to the same time frame. Studies in different countries were
conducted in different years. In comparing different countries, the data for a given
quantity, like cost of currency operations, is sourced from various studies in different
countries, with some variance in the methods used by these studies.

1.7 Delimitations
A shift in the payment instrument used in the economy has diverse impacts with
the change in costs being just one of them. Any decision on policy requires that all
possible impacts are considered in a complete context. However, this thesis is restricted to
only examining the shift from a cost perspective. There are other possible impacts that
have not been examined in this study. A shift to a cashless society could result in the
people giving up their rights to fnancial privacy. Financial information about individuals
in a cashless society can be available to fnancial organizations, which may or may not be
associated with the government as well as the government itself. The power these entities
gain by having the ability to oversee, infuence and control the fnancial decisions made by
the people warrants an extensive discussion that is not provided here. The spending habits
of consumers is also impacted. Consumers, when spending in cash, are limited by the
amount of cash they hold whereas credit cards do not necessarily limit the expenditure and
could increase a consumer’s debt. There are costs to maintaining a balance on a line of
revolving credit, and these costs have not been addressed here. Hence, this work only
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studies one of the multiple components needed for a complete understanding of the shift
from a cash to non-cash economy.

1.8 Summary
This chapter provides the context for the rest of the thesis. With multiple electronic
payment instruments competing against cash and forces of administration advocating the
adoption of electronic payments, this thesis looks at the reasons cash has fallen out of
favour and the security concerns that accompany the use of electronic payment
instruments. Some countries, like Belgium, are almost cashless while other countries, like
Australia, are actively pushing to measures to become cashless. This thesis evaluates
whether there are any cost benefts to migrating from cash to electronic payments.
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CHAPTER 2. CONCERNS IN CASH MEDIUM
Cash, as defned by the Oxford Dictionary, is ‘money in coins or notes, as distinct
from cheques, money orders, or credit’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). Generally, lower
denominations are issued as coins while paper currency is printed with higher
denominations. Cash is considered as legal tender with the purchasing power of the face
value printed on it. Cash has been in circulation for centuries and enjoys near global
acceptance. Even today, with many competing technologies available in the payment
market, cash retains its dominance in the economy of most countries worldwide. Cash, by
nature possesses the following attributes (Beer et al., 2016):
• Anonymity - Transactions made in cash are anonymous. For money spent in cash,
there exists no trail to identify the who, when, where and why of the money spent.
This contrasts with payment forms like cheques which usually indicate the payee,
payer and the amount paid or card payments that leave a digital footprint. Cash is
not subject to oversight. Anonymity of transactions is a primary reason why cash is
preferred for illicit transactions.
• Liquidity - Cash is accepted as legal tender and can be used to make purchases.
Cash retains its face value irrespective of the number of transactions for which it has
been used.
• Zero Interest - An entity can indefnitely store cash without its monetary value
changing. Monetary value, here refers to the denominational value of the currency
independent of infation or defation in the economy. While stored cash does not
generate interest as opposed to deposited cash in banks, it also does not attract any
charges. Thus, cash can be withheld from circulation without affecting any change
to its monetary value. Hence, stored cash has zero interest; it neither appreciates nor
depreciates.
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Table 2.1. GSMA Risk Assessment for Cash (Chatain et al., 2008; Solin & Zerzan,
2010)
General Risk Factor
Anonymity
Elusiveness

Rapidity
Poor Oversight

Risk Description
the risk of not knowing a
customer’s actual identity
the ability to disguise
transaction totals, origins,
and destinations
the speed with which
transactions can occur
the risk of escaping the notice
of authorities

Risk Level
Highly Prevalent Risk
Highly Prevalent Risk

Low Risk
Highly Prevalent Risk

• Physical Exchange - Cash transactions require a physical exchange, where the payer
and payee are present in person for the exchange to occur. It is not possible to
exchange cash over virtual or digital medium.
• Immediate and Irreversible Transactions - Cash transactions are immediate; they do
not involve any processing time. Cash transactions leave no trail and hence cannot
be undone.
Cash, while being a preferred medium in many large economies, owing to its
attributes also becomes the preferred medium for certain illicit activities (Money
laundering through the physical transportation of cash, 2015). The recent decade has
seen many governments, economists and fnancial authorities around the world advocate
the elimination of cash, especially large paper bills and embrace the digital payment
methods. Kenneth Rogoff, a leading American economist and professor at the Harvard
University is a prominent advocate of curbing the use of cash. In his book, ‘The Curse of
Cash’ (Rogoff, 2016), Rogoff states that ”paper money fuels corruption, terrorism, tax
evasion and illegal immigration” and makes an argument for phasing out the large
denomination bills like the $100, $50 and $20 claiming that it would bring a radical
reduction in those crimes. The three main arguments against cash are (Beer et al., 2016):

11
1. Cash is expensive to print, handle and distribute. A cost and beneft analysis by
Swartz et al. (2004) based on three different case studies concluded that cash and
checks are more expensive compared to the cashless alternatives when costs to all
key parties to a transaction are considered. However, a more recent study by the
European Central Bank (ECB) involving 13 of the national central banks in the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) found the average per transaction costs
for cash payments to be the lowest, closely followed by debit card payments
(Schmiedel, Kostova, & Ruttenberg, 2012).
2. While cash offers individual liberty and fnancial freedom, cash also facilitates
criminal activities, money laundering and tax evasion. Due to the lack of oversight
and anonymous trail, cash has become a preferred payment instrument for criminals
and is highly used to foster a shadow economy. A Europol Report on the use of cash
in money laundering states that while not all use of cash is criminal, all criminals
use cash to launder money at some stage in the money laundering process. The
report notes that while use of cash is slowly declining with consumers, it remains
the criminals instrument of choice to facilitate money laundering (Why is cash still
king? A strategic report on the use of cash by criminal groups as a facilitator for
money laundering., 2015).
3. The threat of consumers hoarding cash keeps fnancial institutions from adopting
monetary policies with negative interest rates. Negative interest rates, some
economists theorize, could encourage spending to help fght recessions and
defation while others view it as a policy set-up for failure (Beer et al., 2016).
Further empirical data is required to validate either of those views. A discussion on
these monetary policies is outside the scope of this thesis.
This thesis focuses on the frst and second arguments: cost of cash and role of cash in
illegal activities. Comparisons against electronic payment systems are made with respect
to costs involved and losses suffered due to illegal activities. The effect of cash or the lack
thereof on the monetary policies has not been discussed in this work.
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2.1 Drugs and Illegal Activities
The anonymity in cash transactions makes it diffcult to identify and evidence the
parties involved in the sale of prohibited drugs. Drug traffcking is a cash intensive
business. Drug money begins with the retail of drugs for cash; then the proceeds are
consolidated in a counting house where lower denominations like USD 10 and USD 20
bills are converted to higher denominations of USD 50 and USD 100 to make it easier for
transporting. (Money laundering through the physical transportation of cash, 2015). The
drug traffcking business accounts for 50% of criminal proceeds in global crime, with over
80% of the business being done in cash. The estimated annual losses due to drug
traffcking amount to USD 320 billion, with USD 256 billion being in cash proceeds
(Sands, 2016). Even if initial crime proceeds occur in non-cash medium, cash is
introduced in the chain via ATM withdrawals or other methods to break the audit trail.
Thus, the drug traffcking business generates annual proceeds in billions of dollars and
primarily operates in cash. In 2010, the Mexican government imposed a limit on the
deposit and exchange of US dollar bills in their banks (Pietschmann & Walker, 2011).
This restraint on depositing US currency bills in Mexican banks was imposed to check the
illicit profts from drug business making it from the United States to Mexico. While
reports from both Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Europol corroborate the
signifcance of cash in organised crime and money laundering schemes, a Deutsche Bank
Research notes, “law enforcement are simply more prepared and successful in detecting
illegal cash movements than illegal (cashless) fnancial fows” (Mai, 2016).

2.2 Tax Evasion and Money Laundering
Money laundering is defned in the article 6 of the UN Palermo Convention 2000
as, “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of
crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offense to evade
the legal consequences of his or her action; The concealment or disguise of the true
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nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; Subject to the basic
concepts of its legal system: The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at
the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime; Participation in,
association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting,
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offenses established in
accordance with this article” (Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to
counterfeiting of currency, 2013).
Money laundering aims to re-introduce money obtained from illegal sources back
into the economy. Income earned in cash, by legal means or otherwise is diffcult to tax
owing to the anonymity associated with cash transactions. The Money laundering through
the physical transportation of cash (2015) report by Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
shows that tax fraud is the third leading offense after drug traffcking and smuggling that
generates cash proceeds. The ease of tax evasion and corruption using cash has prompted
governments to clamp down on its use (Beretta, 2014). In 2012, the Spanish government
imposed a ban on cash payments for more than 2,500 Euros. In the same year, the Spanish
police with the support of Interpol conducted Operation Emperador where they seized
around EUR 12 million in cash from a Chinese Organised Crime Group (OCG) which
orchestrated money laundering and tax evasion on an industrial scale. This was the largest
cash seizure ever in Spain (Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by
criminal groups as a facilitator for money laundering., 2015). In 2016, the Indian
Government declared the two highest denominations of Indian currency, INR 500 and
INR 1000 as ceasing to be legal tender overnight; this action outlawed almost 80% of the
currency in circulation (Rogoff, 2016). The demonetization of the higher denominations
was an attempt to curb corruption and counterfeit money (RBI Frequently Asked
Questions, 2017). Thus, governments from several countries have actively made efforts to
contain the use of paper money.
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2.3 Currency Counterfeiting
Currency counterfeiting, as defned in Article 3 of the Currency Counterfeiting
Convention (CCC) 1929 refers to “fraudulent making or altering of currency, whatever
means are employed”(Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting
of currency, 2013). Currency counterfeiting is a widespread and highly proftable offense
that is often linked to acts of money laundering, terrorist fnancing or organised crime.
The Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency (2013)
report by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) notes that cash couriers are most frequently
used to move the proceeds of a crime. The report also notes that involving with
cash-intensive businesses, moving cash through multiple jurisdictions, transfers through
multiple accounts and false or misleading declaration of goods and services are the most
frequently used techniques for the layering and integration of proceeds of crime related to
counterfeit currency (Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of
currency, 2013).
While the links to Organised Crime (OC) and Terrorist Financing (TF) are a
serious threat to a nation’s security, currency counterfeiting can also weaken the economy
of a nation as it essentially introduces illegal tender in circulation which can induce
infation as well as cause loss of confdence in currency. In an Interpol survey of 100
countries, 98 reported detection/ seizure of counterfeit currencies. The US dollar, Euro,
British pound sterling and Chinese Yuan renminbi were the top four currencies reported as
counterfeited by other countries as shown in fgure 2.1 (Money laundering and terrorist
fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency, 2013). However, losses from counterfeit
currency which amount to 0.2% of all criminal proceeds globally, are completely dwarfed
by losses from other crimes such as drug traffcking, smuggling, counterfeit goods, and
others (Pietschmann & Walker, 2011, p. 33).
Currency counterfeiting relies entirely on cash circulation. Elimination of cash or
restrictions on cash circulation would kill the motivation to print counterfeit currency as it
would no longer remain proftable.
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Figure 2.1. Percentage of top 10 currencies reported as counterfeit by 98 different
countries. (Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency,
2013)

2.4 Terrorist Financing
Terrorist fnancing refers to the fnancing of terrorist acts, and of terrorists and
terrorist organisations (Money laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting
of currency, 2013). The money used to fnance terrorism may or may not be obtained by
legal means. Terrorist fnancing attempts not to veil the source of the money but rather the
destination or purpose for which those funds are used. Cash couriers are used to move
money for purposes of terrorist fnancing. Large quantities of cash seized at trans-national
borders across the world are suspected to have been gathered from various enterprises for
purpose of terrorist fnancing (Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash
by criminal groups as a facilitator for money laundering., 2015). In November 2013,
nearly EUR 770,000 was seized at Brussels airport from two Lebanese passengers. The
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cash is suspected to be intended to fnance the military wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon
(Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by criminal groups as a
facilitator for money laundering., 2015). Post the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France in
2015, the then French Finance Minister Michel Sapin, in order to fght “low-cost
terrorism”, made it illegal for the French citizens to make purchases exceeding 1000 euros
using cash.

2.5 Summary
The lack of audit trails and anonymity provided by cash transactions makes it
easier for bad actors to maintain their business without alerting the authorities. A society
that eliminates cash is expected to see a decline in crimes that are cash-intensive. While
the absence or scarcity of cash in the economy would raise the bar for bad actors to
succeed in their business, it does not completely do away with the shadow economy.
While losses from cash aided illegal activities run in billions of US dollars, when calling
for a replacement of cash by non-cash payment instruments, it is essential to compare
losses that can occur due to crimes aided by non-cash methods as well.
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CHAPTER 3. CONCERNS IN NON-CASH MEDIUM
A cashless economy, as the name suggests, is one where fnancial transactions do
not involve the exchange of cash in the form of paper money or coins. A variety of
payment instruments can be used in a cashless transaction. Payment cards like credit card,
prepaid card, debit card or gift card or electronic banking, cheques and mobile banking are
all examples of non-cash payment instruments being used today. While non-cash payment
instruments have found their way into almost all economies around the globe, the extent to
which they are used varies from less than 10% to more than 90%. The Thomas et al.
(2013) survey ranked countries by the share of non-cash payments in the total value of
consumer payments in the nations considered. Figure 3.1 shows the countries ranked and
categorized into four categories depending on the share of non-cash payments in their
respective economies (Thomas et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.1. Ranking of nations by % of non-cash payments (Thomas et al., 2013)
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Payment cards, frst issued by banks in the late 1940s, have been the dominant
non-cash payment instrument in use for over half a century now (Stearns, 2011).
However, the recent decade has seen signifcant technological progress with the mobile
phones and computers turning into devices that enable fnancial transactions. Electronic
banking, amongst other fnancial services, enables the transfer of payment from payer’s
bank account to the payee’s account over the internet. Financial services can be accessed
by using the mobile banking technology which is implemented using applications on
smart phones or Short Message Service (SMS) and Unstructured Supplementary Service
Data (USSD) technology on a simple Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) phone. Mobile
payments equipped with Near Field Communication (NFC) technology and fngerprint
authentication increase the convenience of transaction as well as confdence in the
integrity of the transaction.
Economies around the world have witnessed a growth in the use of digital payment
methods to varying extents. The implementation of digital payment methods requires
establishing an infrastructure to support it. From merchants installing card readers at Point
of Sale (PoS), to banks increasing server capacity to handle traffc, and even consumers
possessing devices such as smart cards or mobile phones, the implementation of a cashless
society demands additional resources from all links in the consumer chain. This can be an
expensive affair, especially in developing economies where it can be diffcult to ensure the
availability of electricity or internet services.
Additionally, developing economies see a signifcant percentage of their
population outside the net of fnancial inclusion due to bank branches being far and few in
comparison to the population spread. Without access to formal banking services, the
populations in those economies are unable to use credit or debit cards, or electronic
banking. Cash is the primary instrument for fnancial transaction in these societies.
In developing economies where mobile phone penetration is extensive, mobile
money holds the promise to bring the unbanked population within the net of fnancial
inclusion by including them in the formal banking system. In 2007, the telecom giant
Safaricom launched a mobile money transfer service, M-Pesa, in Kenya. The service
rapidly captured a huge market share in the country and has grown to an active user base
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of 18 million. Digital payment methods have this major advantage over cash as they do
not require parties involved in a transaction to be physically present at the same location.
Transaction fees are levied by banks and payment authorities like Visa and
MasterCard from merchants that accept non-cash payments. Thus, all purchases or
transactions made using non-cash instruments like payment cards incur a charge over and
above the price of the item purchased. There are no additional transaction charges on cash
payments paid either by the merchant or the customer.
The evolution of digital payment methods has been rapid and recent, compared to
cash payments. Authorities have well established detection and mitigation techniques to
check fraud in cash. Being relatively recent, the policies, tools and techniques to detect
and mitigate fraud in the digital medium are insuffcient and struggling to catch up with
the rapid technological advancement made in the feld. Even though non-cash payments
leave a digital foot print and can be monitored, with multiple digital payment channels, it
becomes diffcult to check for fraud that occurs across channels. Electronic payment fraud
is a growing concern, with many businesses establishing an online presence and also
government agencies shifting to the digital platform to provide services to citizens.
The wide acceptance of digital payment methods across the world and its merits
have motivated certain sections to rally for the complete elimination of cash in favour of
the digital medium. Financial authorities and national governments have especially been
inclined in favour of digital payment medium. The proliferation, and in some cases the
mandate of digital payment methods, has concerned other factions that challenge the idea
of eliminating cash, by arguing that digital medium comes with its own set of new issues.
The primary concerns with non-cash payment instruments are discussed hereafter.

3.1 Privacy Concerns
Non-cash payments are made using the digital medium. This means every
transaction leaves a digital footprint containing, but not limited to, meta data on parties
involved in the transaction, the date and time it occurred, the transacted amount,
sometimes even the purpose of the transaction. This data can be accessed by the bank
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issuing the payment card. It can also be accessed by card issuing payment companies like
MasterCard, Visa, Discover and others. With the use of mobile money gathering pace,
countries have toughened their Know Your Customer (KYC) process, based on the
recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to keep a check on
money laundering and terrorist fnancing. The KYC process requires organizations to
verify the identity of their customers. Telecom operators are now required to follow a
strict KYC process before issuing SIM Cards to new customers. Banks and other fnancial
bodies are also among those required to follow through KYC norms. Between a thorough
identity check of customers and digital footprints for every activity, the digital medium
tries to ensure that there remains no anonymity in transactions and a clear audit trail can
be maintained. These practices are followed so that the money can be traced from source
to destination, and the source and destination can be identifed clearly.
Compared to cash transaction, the Know Your Customer (KYC) norms raise the
bar for bad actors who try to get away with acts of fraud. However, it also provides
authorities with a substantial power to oversee transactions of all consumers, criminal or
otherwise, thereby infringing upon the privacy of citizens. These transactions come into
the purview of the government restrictions and surveillance. Depending on the political
inclination of the authority, this can result in unfavourable consequences.
Operation Choke Point is an example of the powers that an administration can
have in controlling fnances in the electronic medium. Operation Choke Point, a 2013
initiative by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in USA, targeted certain merchants with an
online presence by cutting off their fnancial services in order to choke their business.
Without the ability to process payments online, these merchants would not be able to
survive. The DOJ exerted pressure on banks and third party payment processors to revoke
their services from these client merchants that were put on the choke list. The businesses
affected were not illegal, per se, but deemed as ‘harmful’ by the then administration of the
country. This list included business involved in escort services, ammunition sales, on-line
gambling, get-quick-rich schemes, payday loans and racist materials. Bank accounts of a
few porn actors were also terminated for ‘moral reasons’.
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While the lack of privacy in the digital medium as compared to cash medium can
increase the percentage of fraudsters caught by the legal system, it is a double-edged
sword that can also cause damage to regular citizens in order to push the agenda of the
administration.

3.2 Security Concerns
Just like cash aids crimes like currency counterfeiting, drug traffcking and others,
non-cash payment methods come with their share of vulnerability to fraud. In a cashless
society, all money is information. Therefore, it is subjected to the same risk as all
information is in digital age. Customers risk losing money if their bank suffers a
cyber-attack. In every online purchase, there is a risk of the consumer losing sensitive card
or bank account details. Major merchants like Target and Home Depot have been
breached leading to the loss of fnancial information of millions of customers. Any attack
on third party payment processors like Visa and MasterCard, which hold the major share
of payment cards between themselves, could affect millions around the world. Apart from
the threat of a cyber-attack on institutions holding fnancial information, fraud can also
occur due to card skimming, intercepting message, stolen passwords, etc. Hence, it is not
safe to assume that non-cash medium is fraud resistant. It only gives rise to new methods
of frauds.
The Money laundering using new payment methods (2010) report by FATF
confrms that to a certain degree digital payment methods are vulnerable to abuse for
money laundering and terrorist fnancing purposes although the dimension of the threat is
diffcult to assess. The report notes that the ML/TF risks posed can be effectively
mitigated by several countermeasures taken by digital payment service providers.
However, this report was published in 2010 and the digital payment arena has advanced
since then. Also, with increases in restrictions on cash and more reliance on non-cash
methods, criminals are getting more creative and sophisticated in circumventing checks in
the non-cash medium.
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Globally, the growth rate of card volume peaked in 2010, which was followed by a
peak in card fraud growth in 2011 (The Nilson Report, 2016). The Nilson Report (2016)
fnds a 21.4% rise in global card fraud in 2015, as compared to 2014. Figure 3.2 shows a
comparison in card volume and card fraud over the period of 2008-2015 (The Nilson
Report, 2016). Although in the initial period of 2008-2010, the rate at which fraud
increased was lesser than the rate at which card volume increased, the fraud growth rate
curve later goes on to exceed the growth rate of card volume. Fraud peaks immediately
the year after the highest growth rate in card volume, suggesting that a signifcant increase
in the usage of cards might attract greater fraud. However, the converse does not seem to
be true as the fraud rate in recent years has remained almost consistent despite the decline
in growth rate of card volume. See Figure 3.2.
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In a non-cash based economy, money is essentially information and is subject to
the threats similar to any other digital information. A non-cash payment system, could
hence be viewed as an information system and evaluated using security models for
information systems. The CIA Triad and the Parkerian hexad are security frameworks
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available to assess security issues arising in an information system. The CIA triad
consisting of three components confdentiality, integrity, and availability is a the most
widely known security model. The Parkerian hexad furthers the CIA model by adding
three additional elements namely, authenticity, possession or control, and utility. The
Parkerian hexad security framework evaluates a system on the following parameters:
• Confdentiality - It is a necessary component of privacy and refers to the ability to
protect data from unauthorized access (Andress, 2014).
• Integrity - The ability to prevent the data from being changed in an undesired or
unauthorized manner (Andress, 2014).
• Availability - The ability to access data whenever needed (Andress, 2014).
• Possession or Control - Refers to the physical ownership and control of the data/
media device (Andress, 2014).
• Authenticity - Refers to the proper attribution of the owner or creator (Andress,
2014).
• Utility - Refers to usefulness of data (Andress, 2014).
The Parkerian hexad provides a more comprehensive and complete framework to
evaluate an information system. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the shift from
cash to non-cash is a shift from physical money to digital money, which is essentially
information; hence an evaluation of security in a cashless economy using security models
applied to information systems is warranted.
3.3 Summary

A shift to a cashless economy could potentially dictate the choices consumers’ make
between spending and saving their money. Financial censorship could become a reality,
especially in societies with an overbearing government. A cyber-attack on a single entity
like a digital payment accepting merchant could put the fnancial information of all its
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customers at risk. For the purpose of this study, we only look at security concerns in a
cashless economy and gauge the losses that occur due to electronic fraud. A comparison
of estimated fraud losses in electronic medium to those in cash medium will help in
understanding whether a cashless economy is more fraud resistant than a cash based
economy.
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CHAPTER 4. THE CASE OF SWEDEN, USA AND INDIA
The economies around the world have been penetrated, to varying degrees, by
competing payment instruments like cards, electronic wallets, banking apps, near-feld
communication (NFC) based payments and others, which offer a digital alternative to
paper money. Figure 4.1 shows the number of card payments per person per year and the
cash-to-GDP ratio (%) in a selection of countries. It is diffcult to obtain accurate data on
the number of cash transactions occurring in an economy. Cash as % of GDP provides a
measure of the volume of cash in circulation, which has been used to estimate the cash
usage in that society. It can be observed from the Figure 4.1 that, with the exception of
USA, countries with high usage of card payments tend to have less than 5% cash-to-GDP
ratio. Most countries with less than 100 annual card payments per person have a
cash-to-GDP ratio of greater than 5%, with few being greater than 10%.
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Figure 4.1. Usage of cards and cash in a selection of countries in 2013 (Segendorf &
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For this study, Sweden, USA and India are examined, all three of which are at
different stages in the transition to cashless economy spectrum, to compare the losses each
of those nations suffer as a result of fraudulent and illegal activities aided by cash as well
as losses due to non-cash payment medium. Although the data is from 2013, and these
ratios have changed since then, it is reasonable to assume that the position of these
countries relative to each other remains unchanged. Sweden had a cash-to-GDP ratio of
2.4% in 2013, with nearly all of its transactions being done using non-cash payment
methods and is classifed as a ‘nearly cashless’ economy (Thomas et al., 2013). The
USA, with a cash-to-GDP ratio of 7.65%, relatively has a high usage of card payments per
person and is classifed as an economy on the ‘tipping point’ in the transition from cash to
non-cash (Thomas et al., 2013). India, with a cash-to-GDP ratio of 12%, and the least
usage of card payments, fnds itself a spot in the list of countries in the ‘inception’ stage of
shifting towards a cashless economy (Thomas et al., 2013).
Due to its liquidity and anonymity, cash has been linked to various illegal
activities. The Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by criminal
groups as a facilitator for money laundering. (2015) report by Europol observes that
“almost all crime types make use of cash to facilitate money laundering”. Figure 4.2
shows the perception of people about the level of corruption in their society against the
usage of paper money by consumers in that society. The higher the score on the corruption
scale, the less corrupt the society is perceived to be. It can be observed that consumers in
cash intensive societies perceive their economy to be more corrupt while the general
perception of people in a less cash-intensive economy is that their society is less corrupt.
Another study about shift from paper check to Electronic Beneft Transfer (EBT) system
for welfare benefts found a signifcant reduction in crime after the shift to EBT (Wright et
al., 2014). Thus, the high usage of cash has been linked to a variety of criminal activities
and cash intensive societies are perceived to be more corrupt.
Non-cash payments, have also witnessed a growth in annual losses due to
electronic frauds like fraud using stolen card credentials, counterfeiting of cards, fraud in
mobile fnance and online banking fraud amongst others, across the world. A study by the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) has found that mobile fnance has ‘rapidly
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become a conduit for fraud and other criminal activity’ in countries like Kenya, Uganda
and Tanzania where transactions worth billions of dollars are done annually using mobile
technology (Fraud in Mobile Financial Services: Protecting Consumers, Providers, and
the System, 2017). Globally, a rise in frauds relating to payment cards have been
observed. It can be observed from Figure 4.3 that losses due to certain types of card fraud
have more than doubled between 2005 to 2015. Card not present fraud occurs when a card
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Figure 4.3. Global Card Fraud Losses 2005-2015 (Global Card Fraud, 2016)

is used for making online payments instead of a payment at the point of sale and does not
require the physical card but only the information on the card. The increase in this fraud
could possibly be due breaches at companies that lead to card details being leaked.
Thus, crimes specifc to both cash and non-cash medium contribute to losses
worldwide. The cases of three specifc countries are examined to see if the transition from
cash to non-cash could result in a reduction of losses or merely a transfer of the cause of
loss from one type of crime to another. The sections that follow elaborate on the
percentage of cash in circulation, the payment landscape, the estimated losses due to cash
crimes and losses due to electronic payment frauds in each of these countries.

4.1 Sweden
Cash circulation in Sweden in 2016 amounts to roughly 1.8% of its GDP, which is
one of the lowest ratios in world (Mai, 2016). The decline in cash and rise in electronic
payments in Sweden over the recent years is shown in Figure 4.4. From the fgure, it can
be observed that between 2008 to 2015, the cash to ratio GDP has reduced by nearly a
half. The percentage of cash transactions in all transactions under the value of SEK 100,
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has reduced from 60% in 2010 to 40% in 2014. In all transactions over a SEK 100,
percentage of cash transactions remains less than 20%. Thus, cash seems to be most used
in low value transactions, and even there its usage has been shrinking. Sweden has
witnessed a growing distance from cash usage owing to the shift to electronic payments
with 68% of all electronic payments being made with cards (Mai, 2016). Although card
payments hold a dominant share of the payment market, they are facing some competition
with Swedes adopting to mobile commerce, especially with the growth in usage of the
Swish mobile app (Financial Cards and Payments in Sweden, 2016).
Sweden:
Cash in decline

Sweden:
Less cash and more electronic payments
Share of cash payments in total number of
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Figure 4.4. Cash Usage in Sweden (Mai, 2016)

4.1.1 Cash and Crime
With cash being rare, Swedish authorities have ceased the handling of cash over
the counter completely; this has resulted in organised crime taking increased interest in
cash-intensive businesses and currency exchangers, which fuels the risks of money
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Table 4.1. Reasons for Suspicion of STR flings (%, Jan 2013-Jun 2016)(Anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist fnancing measures - Sweden, 2017)
2016
Reason for Suspicion
2013 2014 2015
(June)
Repeated foreign transactions/ large foreign transactions 27.2 33.2 30.6 18.8
Irregular transaction
11.4 14.8 22.2 23.1
Repeated transactions/large transactions to an account
8.8
14.4 12.9 27.7
Repeated cash withdrawals/ large cash withdrawal
17.1 9.9
6.5
5.0
Repeated cash deposits/ large cash deposits
11.7 9.1
10.1 6.5
Presumably customer submitted false information
4.1
4.5
4.1
5.8
Repeated currency exchange/ large exchange
9.4
3.8
2.6
1.8
The customer is likely to be an agent
1.3
1.7
1.1
1.7
Repeated cash purchases/ large cash purchases
1.7
1.2
0.8
0.6
Coloured notes
0.2
0.1
0
0.1
Terrorism Financing
0.1
0.3
0.7
1.7
Other
7.1
7.0
8.4
7.3

laundering and terrorist fnancing (ML/TF) (Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
fnancing measures - Sweden, 2017). Swedish authorities link large cash transactions to
ML/TF risks, with storing and transport of cash being the second most used measure for
money laundering (Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist fnancing measures Sweden, 2017). Cash deposits/withdrawals was also the second leading cause for
suspicion in the Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) fled, following large foreign
transactions (Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist fnancing measures - Sweden,
2017). Cash, whether as large deposits/withdrawals or in exchange currency, features in
nearly half the causes for suspicion leading to the fling of a STR. See Table 4.1.
The Swedish authorities identify tax fraud related to unregistered labor as the most
signifcant predicate offence for money laundering (Anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist fnancing measures - Sweden, 2017). The Economic Crime Report of
Sweden is published every ten year (The Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s 2014 status
report, 2014). The recent report from 2014 estimates the size of the black economy to be
65% of Swedens Gross National Product (GNP). The Swedish Tax Agency estimates the
value of the shadow economy to be circa SEK 133 billion, of which undeclared work
accounts for SEK 66 billion. Most of the tax evasion was observed in sectors like
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construction, cleaning, restaurants and bars, which are prone to hire unregistered labor.
The report found tax evasions, especially by industries in construction, amounted to SEK
10 billion. Although the percentage of cash was not specifcally broken down, the report
found that cash was a common factor amongst crimes that were investigated (The Swedish
Economic Crime Authority’s 2014 status report, 2014). Cross border cash smuggling lead
to major seizures of undeclared cash by Swedish Custom authorities amounting to SEK
1.6 million in 2016 (Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist fnancing measures Sweden, 2017).
Currency counterfeiting in Sweden does not seem to be a signifcant problem. In
2016, 379 banknotes of counterfeit currency were seized;Sweden had a total of 288
million banknotes in circulation at that time (Statistics on notes and coins, 2017). Despite
low instances of counterfeit currency, Sweden has been replacing old currency notes with
new ones having better counterfeit resistant properties, in phases since 2013 (Statistics on
notes and coins, 2017).

4.1.2 Crime in non-cash Payment Medium
According to the European Union’s ‘Fourth report on card fraud’, losses due to
card fraud in Sweden amount to a little more than 0.02% of the total value of card
transactions (Fourth report on card fraud, 2015). Since 2012, Sweden has seen increasing
number of fraudulent card transactions each year. The amount lost due to fraudulent card
transactions between 2011 - 2016 is shown in Figure 4.2. Card frauds, along with the
number of card transactions have increased in the period between 2008-2015, and
continue in the upward direction. On an average, card fraud losses in Sweden, amounted
to SEK 285 million per year.
Thus, fndings from Sweden show that the losses due to frauds in electronic
payment methods are dwarfed by the losses suffered due to fraudulent activities aided by
cash. While an average of SEK 285 million per year is lost due to fraud in card payments
(cards being the dominant payment instrument), close to an estimated SEK 66 billion is
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Figure 4.5. Rise in Card Fraud (2008-2015) (Mai, 2016)

Table 4.2. Rise in Card Fraud - Sweden (Value Lost to Fraud, 2017)
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

SEK million
260.4
267.0
273.1
288.0
286.2
336.3

lost due to cash-intensive industries attempting to evade taxes by employing undeclared
labor.
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4.2 USA
Cash circulation in USA amounts to roughly 7.65% of its GDP(Segendorf &
Wretman, 2015). Segendorf and Wretman (2015) divide the countries in three
categorizes: ‘card-intensive’ with low cash usage countries as red nations, relatively
higher cash usage and lower card usage countries as blue nations and emerging markets
that are cash-intensive with low card usage as green nations. USA is the only country that
is card-intensive and has a relatively high cash-to-GDP ratio, as can be observed from the
Figure 4.1. One reason for this is that US currency is in circulation outside the country as
well. The Federal Reserve of the United States estimates that about three-quarters of the
currency in circulation is the USD 100 bill, of which three-quarters are held outside the
United States (National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, 2015, p. 33). The US
payment landscape also contains non-cash payment instruments such as prepaid and
non-prepaid debit cards, credit cards, ACH credit and debit transfers, mobile payments
and cheques (The Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2016). Figure 4.6 shows trends in
payment market over the period 2000-2015, where it can be seen that number of card
payments, especially with non prepaid debit cards has consistently increased. Another
mode of electronic payment, the Automated Clearing House (ACH) transfers account for
only 16.3% of non-cash transactions by number, but they make up 81.6% of the
transactions by value (The Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2016). One reason for this is
the use of ACH payments for salary payment by organizations, online bill payments, etc.
where the value of amount transferred is greater than everyday purchases made using card
transactions. A US Consumer Payment survey conducted every year revealed that
consumers have consistently, over the past fve years, preferred to pay with card, with only
11% of consumers stating cash as their preferred instrument in the 2016 survey (2016 U.S.
Consumer Payment Study, 2016).
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Figure 4.6. Trends in non-cash payments (2000-2015), by number of payments (in
billions)(The Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2016)

4.2.1 Cash and Crime
Cash, due its being anonymous, widely accepted and untraceable, is an effective
money laundering instrument in USA. To mitigate risks of anonymous cash that could
potentially be illegally obtained, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) required fnancial
institutions to meet anti-money laundering (AML) requirements of customer identifcation
and record keeping. Financial institutions are also required to report to the IRS or FinCEN
deposit or withdrawal of cash exceeding USD 10,000 by a customer in a single day
(National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, 2015). While this keeps a check on large
sums of cash entering the fnancial institutions, it still leaves complicit retailers and
wholesalers who continue to accept cash in amounts exceeding USD 10,000 without
reporting, for the law enforcement to deal with. Due to diffculty involved in moving large
amounts of cash, countries that are geographically close or share a border become
particularly attractive as the frst step in the money laundering process (Pietschmann &
Walker, 2011). KPMG, a fnancial services frm, estimates annual cash smuggling of
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Table 4.3. Rise in Card Fraud - USA (Value Lost to Fraud, 2017)
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

USD million
3,484.7
3,687.5
3,920.7
4,312.1
4,742.5
5,324.4

USD 25 billion from USA to Mexico; academic estimates range from USD 6 billion to
USD 36 billion (Pietschmann & Walker, 2011).
The United States Dollar is reported as the most counterfeited currency (Money
laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency, 2013). A United
States Secret Service (USSS) estimate from 2005 states that, there exists one counterfeit
USD for every USD 12,400 out of the USD 760 billion in circulation (Money laundering
and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency, 2013). The United States
Secret Services (USSS) annual report for the year 2015 reports a seizure of USD 58
million (Annual 2015 Report, 2016).

4.2.2 Crime in Non-Cash Payment Medium
As observed from Figure 4.6, payments involving non-cash instruments have seen
a consistent increasing trend over the years. The increase in usage of non-cash payment
instruments, as expected, has led to more bad actors trying to exploit the non-cash
payment mechanisms. Data on Automated Clearing House (ACH) fraud trends was not
found as most payment fraud trend data pertained to card payments. Table 4.3 shows the
losses incurred due to card fraud in USA between 2011-2016. As can be observed, the
losses due to card fraud have been consistently increasing each year. An average of USD
4245.3 million is lost to card fraud each year.
Thus, fndings from USA show that the average estimated annual losses due to
fraud in electronic payments is about USD 4.2 billion, while the estimated cash losses is
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over fve times as much at USD 25 billion. In the United States, the estimates for fraud
losses in non-cash medium are dwarfed by fraud losses cash medium.

4.3 India
An insuffcient banking infrastructure with a large segment of population being
un-banked or under-banked contributes to the large cash economy in India (Black Money,
2012). A low percentage of the Indian population has access to non-cash payment
instruments (Mazzotta et al., 2014). India has one of the highest cash-to-GDP ratio of
about 12% (Report of the Committee on Medium-term Path on Financial Inclusion,
2015). Over 87% of all transactions in 2012 in India were in cash; less than 10% of the
population have ever used any kind of non-cash payment instrument (Report of the
Committee on Medium-term Path on Financial Inclusion, 2015).
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Figure 4.7. Transaction Profle for cash and non-cash instrument (2007-2012) (Mazzotta
et al., 2014)

The annual share of different payment instruments used in transactions in India
over the period of 2007-2012 is shown in Figure 4.7. As can be observed, there has been a
gradual increase in the use of non-cash electronic payment methods, yet cash continues to
be the dominant payment instrument with over 80% of transactions being done with cash
(Nachane, Chakraborty, Mitra, & Bordoloi, 2013).
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4.3.1 Cash and Crime
Chaudhuri, Schneider, and Chattopadhyay (2006) studied the size and growth of
the shadow economy in India over the period of 1974-1996. Their estimates for size of the
shadow economy in the year 1994-1995 was 20.3% of the country’s GDP (Chaudhuri et
al., 2006). The study did not break down the percentage of cash involved. Nachane et al.
(2013) notes that the unchecked growth of India’s “shadow economy” in the latter half of
the 20th century has lead to the creation of a new source of demand for the Indian
currency as an untraceable transaction medium (Nachane et al., 2013). But the size of this
“shadow economy” has been diffcult to estimate, with few good proxies to rely on
(Nachane et al., 2013). A more recent study by Schneider and Enste (2013) reports the
average size of “shadow economy” in India to be 22.4% of its GDP; a 2% rise from the
previous estimate. However, no reliable data was found on the percentage of cash in the
shadow economy (Black Money, 2012).
The Investigation Wing of the Central Board of Direct Taxes in India, under
section 132 of the Indian Income Tax Act, executes the search for and seizure of illegal
gains. Data for the period 2006-2012 is shown in Table 4.4, along with the percentage of
cash in the seized assets (Black Money, 2012). On an average, cash made up 5.12% of the
undisclosed income seized in the investigations. During the fnancial year 2015-16, the
department seized undisclosed income worth INR 61671.2 million Department of Revenue
(2017). Based on the average cash percentage obtained from Table 4.4, a rough estimate
for the value of undisclosed income seized as cash would be INR 3157.57 million.
Indian Currency is also reportedly the ninth most counterfeited currency by value,
and the third most counterfeited currency by number of notes (Money laundering and
terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency, 2013). A 2016 study by the
Indian Statistical Institute on Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) in circulation, estimates
their face value to be about INR 4000 million (Mohan, 2016).
On November 8, 2016, the Indian Prime Minister made an announcement on
national television, stating that the country’s two highest denomination notes of INR 1000
and INR 500, would cease to be legal tender at midnight. The notes made up roughly 86%
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Table 4.4. Percentage of Cash in Seizures by CBDT-India (2006-2012) (Black Money,
2012)
Financial Year

2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12

Total
Undisclosed
Income Admitted
(INR million)
3,6128.9
4,1605.8
4,6130.6
8,1013.5
10,6491.6
9,2894.3

Value
seized
in Cash (INR
million)

% of Cash

1874.8
2063.5
3398.6
3009.7
4402.8
4999.1

5.189
4.960
7.367
3.715
4.134
5.381

of the country’s currency supply. The stated aim of this action was “to fght black money
i.e. cash that is used for tax evasion, crime, terror and corruption” (Rogoff, 2016). The
move was also aimed at curbing fake higher denomination Indian currency, which had
increased in circulation and were being used for anti-national and illegal activities like
terrorist fnancing(RBI Frequently Asked Questions, 2017). The complete effect of
demonetization of the higher denomination on illegally obtained currency as well as
counterfeit currency is yet to be studied.

4.3.2 Crime in Non-Cash Payment Medium
Figure 4.7 shows an increasing trend in card payments, with more card
transactions occurring each year. Numbers on electronic payments involving other
instruments like cell phones were not available. As observed in the case of the countries
discussed earlier, India too witnessed an increase in card fraud that went parallel with the
rise in card usage. Table 4.5 shows data on the value lost to card fraud over the period of
2011-16. An average of INR 5842.6 million is lost to card fraud each year.
In India, fndings show that annual losses due to cash aided crimes reached over
INR 7000 million, while fraud in electronic payment costed an average of INR 5842.6
million. It should be noted that fgure used to estimate cash crime losses here only consists
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Table 4.5. Rise in Card Fraud - India (Value Lost to Fraud, 2017)
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

INR million
4,007.7
4,744.6
5,497.8
6,206.5
6,910.4
7,688.8

of estimates from cash seized by authorities and, from counterfeit cash estimates. Cash
may have a greater share in India’s shadow economy, data on which is scant here.

4.4 Summary
This chapter discussed the payment landscape in Sweden, United States and India,
the losses suffered due to cash crimes and, the losses suffered due to fraud in card
payment systems (the most commonly used electronic payment instrument) in all three
nations. Table 4.6 summarizes the estimated losses from crimes that are facilitated by
cash. This estimate does not consider all possible crimes facilitated by cash. For instance,
data on value lost in bank robberies or theft of cash transit vehicles has not been included.
Although limited in its scope, the table provides a baseline estimate for the annual losses
due to illegal activities facilitated by cash. Even though these estimated losses run in
billions in all three nations, when compared against the overall Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), they amount to no more than 0.2% of their respective nation’s GDP (refer Table
4.6). A shift to electronic payment modes is not expected to eliminate these losses but
rather raise the cost of engaging in these illegal activities, thereby making it more diffcult
for bad actors.
In case of electronic payment fraud, losses due to fraud in all three countries have
generally increased over the period of 2011-2016. Sweden, with the highest percentage of
card transactions among the three countries, has the lowest average annual growth for
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Table 4.6. Losses due to Illegal Activities facilitated by cash (Black Money, 2012; Money
laundering and terrorist fnancing related to counterfeiting of currency, 2013; Money
laundering through the physical transportation of cash, 2015; Pietschmann & Walker,
2011; Report of the Committee on Medium-term Path on Financial Inclusion, 2015; The
Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s 2014 status report, 2014)

Cash-to-GDP
Ratio
(2013)
Money Laundering &
Tax Evasion
Counterfeiting
Total estimated annual
cash losses
GDP (in 2016, in USD)
Annual Cash Losses as
% of GDP (2016)

Sweden
2.4%

USA
7.65%

India
12%

USD 1.12 bil.

USD 25 bil.

USD 0.045 bil.

USD 1.12 bil.

USD 0.05 bil.
USD 25.05 bil.

USD 0.057bil.
USD 0.10 bil.

511 bil.
0.2%

18,569 bil.
0.1%

2,263 bil.
0.00063%

Table 4.7. Average annual growth of card fraud losses (2011-2016)

Average annual growth
of card fraud losses

Sweden
4.83%

USA
8.11%

India
12.19%

losses due to card fraud. India has the highest average growth among the three countries.
Overall, the losses due to card fraud have been increasing from 2011-2016.
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS
The research questions for this study, have been answered based on the data from
the three countries studied in the previous chapter.

What is the cost of losses suffered from illegal acts facilitated by cash in the economy?
Cash, as previously stated, is viewed with suspicion, by authorities, owing to its
preferment by bad actors. Abuse of cash as a payment medium due to drug traffcking,
counterfeiting, bribery and other illegal practices generates losses that run into billions in
the local currency for each of the nations studied. One of the main motivations for
authorities to restrict cash usage is to prevent these losses due to abuse of cash as a
payment medium. Of the three nations, Sweden having the lowest cash-to-GDP ratio, has
the highest cash losses as a percent of GDP. The 2014 Swedish Crime Report estimated
tax evasion losses over SEK 10 billion (The Swedish Economic Crime Authority’s 2014
status report, 2014) in cash intensive industries. While it noted that cash played a major
role, the percentage of cash in these losses was not separately calculated. However, it is
the best estimate we have based on available data. India with its relatively high
cash-to-GDP ratio, has the lowest cash losses as a percent of GDP. Black Money (2012)
report notes that over 90% of illegal income seized is in the form of gold, jewelry, real
estate and other non-cash assets. This suggests that despite high usage of cash in the
country, cash may not be a major contributor to the India’s shadow economy. A move like
the demonetization of high value currency notes in India, would have little effect in
fghting its shadow economy, a major percentage of which operates using non-cash assets.
Thus, fndings from all three countries studied show that restricting cash to cut losses from
cash aided crimes might not add much value to a country’s treasury, be it in a cash rare
economy like Sweden or a cash intensive economy like India.

What is the cost of losses suffered from illegal acts facilitated by non-cash payment
methods, more specifcally illegal activities facilitated by using electronic cards as
payment instruments, in the economy?
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Figure 5.1. Cash to GDP ratio, No. of card transactions and Card Fraud losses - Sweden

The data used for the study captures the trends from 2011 to 2016. With a cash to
GDP ratio under 5%, Sweden has a lead in terms of the shift to becoming a cashless
economy. As seen in Figure 5.1, the cash to GDP ratio in Sweden has seen a decline,
while the number of card transactions has been rising. Although it seems like fraud losses
have remained almost constant during this period, it is a result of the scale used for the
graph. The trend in card fraud loss during this period can be better observed in Figure 5.2.
The linear trend line representing the percentage by which fraud losses
increased/decreased as compared to the previous year is shown in solid orange. The actual
percentages of increase/decrease are shown along the dotted orange line. Barring the dip
in 2015, fraud losses have risen, with a higher growth percentage each year. Expectedly,
the rise in card fraud losses aligns with an increase in card transactions(blue line) and a
reduction in cash in circulation(green line).
In USA, as seen in Figure 5.3, card usage between 2012 and 2015 has risen by
almost 50%. Card fraud losses, in keeping with rise in card usage, have consistently
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increased during this period. The percentage by which fraud losses increase each
consecutive year has also gone from being just under 6% in 2011 to almost 11% in 2016.
A linear increase in the rate at which fraud losses have grown can be observed in Figure
5.4. Even though there has been an increased usage of cards, unlike Sweden, USA has not
witnessed a decline in the volume of cash in the economy. In fact, the cash to GDP ratio
has increased each year; although, the percentage by which this ratio increased annually
has seen a decline.
In India, the slow increase in the number of card transactions at Point of Sale
(PoS) saw a sudden spike from 2015 to 2016. Refer Figure 5.5. This might be indicative
of a greater acceptance of cards in recent years. Card fraud losses, as in the case of the
two countries studied previously have increased each year. However, the percentage by
which these losses have increased every year has seen a slow decline as shown in Figure
5.6. This is in contrast to the trends in Sweden and USA. Some possible reasons for the
decline could be stricter policies and legislations to check card fraud in India as compared
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Figure 5.5. No. of card transactions at PoS and Card Fraud losses - India

to Sweden and USA, implementation of more secure technologies or a lack of interest in
exploiting card payment systems from bad actors. Given that a little faction of the
population uses card, the third reason seems more plausible; however, further research is
required to affrm the reason for the decline. With more people of the society switching to
cards, card fraud may become a lucrative exploit. This could lead the percentage change
curve to follow an increasing path, as was the case with Sweden and USA.
A comparison in the percentage change of the growth in losses due to card fraud
for all three countries is shown in Figure 5.7. As previously observed, the percentage by
which card fraud losses have increased every year, in India has seen a slow decline.
Despite the decline, India has the highest average growth rate among the three countries,
followed by USA and fnally Sweden. The higher average growth rate in India might be
due to card payment systems being relatively recent as compared to Sweden and USA.
In 2016, both Sweden and USA recorded a higher percentage in increase of losses
due to card fraud as compared to India. If India encourages a greater percentage of her
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population to shift from cash to cards, the trend line for India can be expected to mirror
that of Sweden and USA and follow an upward trajectory. Between 2011-2016, losses due
to fraud in India increased at an average rate of 12.19% each year while the card volume
in India during that period increased at an average rate of 18.54% each year. Based on this
data, Figure 5.8 shows projections for the period 2017-2021. The fgure shows the volume
and fraud loss curves on the same trajectory implying the rise in fraud losses with an
increase in card volume. However, the percentage increase in fraud losses during
2011-2016 consistently decreased each year. With the continuity of this trend, the average
percentage by which fraud losses increase in the next fve years could become less than
the current 12.19%. This scenario resembles the state in Sweden and USA, where
percentage increase in fraud is under 10%. An increased adoption of cards would lead to
more monetary losses due to card fraud. In parallel, the popularity of card payment
methods could promote an increased investment in securing that payment mode and
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Figure 5.7. % Growth rate (2012-2016)

creating more security awareness in users. These measures might lead to containing the
percentage by which fraud losses increase each year.
Introduction of new policies in legal and regulatory machinery would become
necessary, especially in emerging markets like India that are in the nascent stages of
migrating from cash to electronic payments, to address electronic fraud concerns.
Electronic medium makes it possible, if not easy, to monitor fnancial activity and keep
track of suspicious accounts, as opposed to cash medium where no auditing or tracing is
possible. To check the increasing fraud rate, the migration to electronic payment systems
needs to be accompanied with the adoption of technologies and policies that are better
equipped to fght fraud. Perhaps, an adoption of electronic payment by a signifcant
portion of a country’s population might push the administration to examine legislations
regarding the payment instrument used. The three countries studied, among themselves,
represent a cash intensive economy, an almost cashless economy, developed nation as well
as a developing nation. Despite these variations in the economies studied, card fraud
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Figure 5.8. Projections for 2017-2021 for India

losses in all three countries have increased each year over the period studies, although the
rate of increase has varied.

Does the shift from paper to electronic means of payment reduce the total societal cost
(i.e. cost of implementing, cost of maintaining, and the cost of loss due to fraud)?
Apart from losses due to abuse, weighing the cost effectiveness of payment
instruments, also includes the cost of implementing and maintaining an ecosystem where
the payment instrument can be used. In the case of cash, the operational costs would
include the cost of printing cash, distribution of cash by cash-in-transit companies,
safeguarding it, counterfeiting costs, and, handling and processing of cash by payee, payer
and the banks (Denecker, Istace, & Niederkorn, 2013; Segendorf & Jansson, 2012). For
cards and other electronic payment instruments, large investments in IT infrastructure, end
point devices such as point of sale card-readers in stores and hardware/software in
depository institutions and card networks are required (Hayashi & Keeton, 2012). The
overall transaction cost is obtained by summing up these resource costs incurred by all
parties to a payment. Overall, the total (social) cost of a transaction would be the sum of at
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Table 5.1. Cost of payment instruments (Segendorf & Jansson, 2012; Swartz et al., 2004)

Unit cost
transaction
Unit cost
transaction

of

cash

Sweden
SEK 8.32

of

card

SEK 5.55

Card/Cash Ratio
*

0.66

USA
USD 1.81
USD
0.79
(credit/charge)
USD 0.8 (debit )
0.44

Data for India was not available.

least 4 different components: consumer (payer) costs, retailer/ business (payee) receiver
costs, bank processing costs and, central bank settlement cost (Hayashi & Keeton, 2012;
D. Humphrey, Willesson, Lindblom, & Bergendahl, 2003). Cash requires relatively less
investment in infrastructure but high a cost to process, handle, print and safeguard. Thus,
it has little fxed costs and a greater variable cost. Alternatively, card payments require a
substantial investment in infrastructure for printing cards, end point card readers, the IT
infrastructure for networking and maintaining account information. But once the
infrastructure is in place, the transactions occur at very low costs. Thus, it has a huge fxed
cost with low variable costs (Hayashi & Keeton, 2012). The costs for a cash transaction
increase with the increase in value of the transaction. A transaction representing the
exchange of a couple of dollars would cost much less than the transaction representing the
exchange of a couple thousand dollars. Alternatively, the difference in cost of card
transaction with rise in transaction value is negligible. Thus, with increase in value of
transaction, use of cash becomes costlier than card (Hayashi & Keeton, 2012).
The cost for both cash and card are associated with economies of scale. This
means that the average cost of a payment of a certain type tends to fall as the number of
payments increases (Segendorf & Jansson, 2012). Hence, in an economy that is cash
intensive, cash might have a lesser cost owing to its wide use. Similarly, card intensive
economies may see a low cost for cards owing to their wide use.
Several studies in different countries have compared the cost of using paper
instruments versus electronic methods for payment (Hayashi & Keeton, 2012;
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D. Humphrey et al., 2003; D. B. Humphrey et al., 2001, 2000; Schmiedel et al., 2012;
Segendorf & Jansson, 2012). Most of the aforementioned academic works conclude
electronic systems to be of lesser cost to the society on the whole. The comparative data
on payment instrument cost for Sweden and USA is as shown in table 5.1. A comparative
study on cost of payment instruments in India was not found. The cost of transaction
using cards being somewhere between half to one-third of cash, indicate that a shift from
cash to card could see as much as a 50% saving in transaction cost. Hence, given the
potential reduction in losses by phasing out cash and the reduced cost of transaction, the
shift to electronic card payment system from a cash based payment system could
economically beneft the society. Currency operations cost in India add up to USD 3.5
billion annually (Mazzotta et al., 2014). Estimating the 50% cost reduction, a shift to
electronic payments by a signifcant portion of the population, might potentially reduce
the annual costs to under USD 1.7 billion. For an emerging market like India, this shift
can be economically benefcial.

5.1 Summary
This chapter has covered costs involved with payment transactions, systems and
instruments. In the evaluation of costs of payment instruments, inclusive of costs of
implementing and maintaining a system that supports the use of the payment instrument
as well as the cost of losses suffered as a result of abuse of the payment instrument, the
cases of three countries Sweden, USA and India - which range from nearly cashless to
cash intensive was studied. While a study of three countries is not suffcient to generalize
at a global scale, a few common themes do stand out - First, the losses from cash aided
crimes cause a loss of less than 1% of a country’s GDP. Hence, the losses prevented due to
lack of cash in the economy, would be modest at best, but not suffcient to warrant a
complete phasing out of cash. Not only in countries where cards/other electronic means
are the dominant payment instrument but also in countries where cash is the dominant
payment instrument, the losses due to cash aided illegal activities remain negligible in
comparison to the overall GDP of that country. Second, card fraud losses continue to

51
rapidly rise. In the US, their growth rate has almost doubled from 2011 to 2016. In
Sweden these losses have seen a rapid increase from close to 1% growth in 2011 to just
under 10% in 2016. Third, based on studies conducted in Sweden and USA, a shift to
electronic payment methods can cut infrastructural costs by more than half. Finally, the
overall costs of a card based economy are lower than that of cash. This however, does not
make it a better system as aspects such as privacy and fnancial independence remain to be
assessed. A more detailed discussion on these follows in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Findings from this study support the notion that a card payment system has lesser
cost to society than paper money. However, cost effectiveness alone is not suffcient to
warrant the shift away from cash and towards an electronic system. The migration to
electronic payment systems would introduce a different set of concerns, of which only a
piece of the security aspect was addressed in this thesis.
A shift to electronic payment systems, along with concerns of security like
payment card fraud and online payment frauds also brings with it concerns regarding
privacy of consumers whose purchases could now be monitored by authorities or meta
data on transactions like location and time of purchase could be determined. The powers
held by the state, or third parties like card issuers or even banks to monitor, control or
interfere in transactions between two parties increases radically when electronic payment
system is used instead of cash. Unlike the costs of payment instrument, the privacy
aspects cannot be quantifed and compared. Nonetheless, they are just relevant to the
discussion of migrating to an electronic payment system. A comparative analysis on these
non-quantifable aspects could contribute to furthering this discussion.
In a cashless economy, the security of the payment mechanisms that are
information systems, remains to be completely examined. Of the six elements of the
Parkerian Hexad, only confdentiality and control were addressed by this thesis.
• Confdentiality - Stolen credentials could lead to a loss of confdentiality resulting in
card fraud. Loss of confdentiality could also occurs when fnancial/ administrative
powers gain access to individual fnancial activities by force or by unpopular
legislation. Only card fraud resulting from loss of confdentiality of card credentials
was examined in this work.
• Integrity - Tampering/ fabrication of fnancial transactions, especially by authorities
has not been addressed. Maintaining the integrity of a fnancial transaction made
using cards requires effort from the banks and card issuers and not just the parties
involved in the transaction, as would have been the case with cash.
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• Availability - Cash is also an insurance against situations of network failure or
electricity failure. In such situations, if electronic/ card payments were the only
possible method of payment, then despite having funds to pay, a consumer would
not be able to make any purchase.
• Possession or Control - Lost/stolen cards could lead to loss of possession and card
fraud which has been addressed here. Even in case of stolen credentials, despite
cards being in owner’s possession, the control over using it as a payment instrument
is lost.
• Authenticity - Technology for ensuring authentication of payment has been
subjected to fraud, especially in card not present scenarios where bad actors could
fool the system into thinking that a card has been used by its rightful owner.
• Utility - Having the data/device is different from being able to use it. Again, in case
of power failures, despite having having a card to pay with external issues render the
card useless.
The Parkerian hexad, with its six elements provides for examining the security in a
non-cash payment system, but does not delve into privacy and liberty aspects, which also
require an evaluation. Cash is also the only form of fnancial inclusion in many developing
regions where citizens lack access to formal fnancial institutions. While preserving the
privacy and anonymity of citizens from the state and other parties in transaction, cash also
limits the control exerted by the state in the fnances of its citizens. Citizens in different
societies can hold different values for their fnancial privacy and differ in their willingness
to hand over the power of fnancial surveillance to their government. Switching to an
electronic system would increase the power that the authorities (governments, banks, third
party payment facilitators like Visa) have over monitoring and controlling the economy.
With no cash to hoard, monetary policies could be introduced to push the consumers to
spend and detract them from ’saving’ money in their accounts. Restrictions on goods and
services that can be bought or sold can be imposed by authorities.
A transition to electronic payment needs to consider the privacy rights and
fnancial rights of individuals. The third chapter briefy discussed the possible
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consequences of giving up the right to anonymously purchase goods and services and the
ability to physically own money that is a store of value. There is a need to study in depth
the shift that occurs in the balance between individual liberty and power of authority when
migrating from cash to electronic medium of payment. Concerns regarding privacy of
consumers, protection of fnancial freedom and effect on monetary policies in an
electronic payment system need to be fully addressed before advocating for a cashless
system.
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